This Committee, as have other advisory bodies on judicial conduct throughout the country, has recognized that it is sometimes necessary for a judge to write letters on behalf of persons with whom he or she is familiar. As far as we have been able to determine, no advisory bodies have interpreted Canon 2(b) to preclude a judge from writing a letter o recommendation under appropriate circumstances. See American Judicature Society, State Justice Institute, Monograph, ARecommendations by Judges,@ Cynthia Gray, Published 1996.

In order to bring consistency to our decisions in this regard and to provide guidance to the Conference, the Committee has adopted the following guidelines with regard to letters of reference:

(1) A judge should never write a letter of reference for a person whom he or she does not know.

(2) A judge may write a letter of reference if it is the type of letter that would be written in the ordinary course of business (e.g., a court employee seeking a reference with regard to the employee=s work history). The letter should include a statement of the source and extent of the judge=s personal knowledge.

(3) The letter should ordinarily be addressed and mailed directly to the party or organization for whose information it is being written. In the case of a personal employee of the judge, such as a law clerk who is seeking other employment, a general letter of reference may be provided and addressed ATo Whom It May Concern.@ Otherwise, this Ablank check@ letter of reference should be avoided.

(4) The Committee also recognizes that it may sometimes be necessary to write a letter of reference for someone whom the judge knows personally and not professionally, such as a relative or close friend. Such letters of reference may be written by a judge if they are the type that he or she would normally be requested to write as a result of the judge=s personal relationships.

(5) Any letter that may be written by a judge may be written on official stationery.

To summarize, letters of reference may be written by a judge if they are of the type that would be written in the ordinary course of business or personal relationships. A judge must take care, however, to be sure that a person with an insubstantial relationship to him or her is not attempting to use the judge=s office to advance personal interests.

This Opinion is intended to give the members of the Conference broad guidelines addressing one of the Committee=s most frequent inquiries. If a judge has questions concerning the application of these guidelines, he or she should make a specific request for advice from the Committee, addressed to the representative for the zone in which the judge sits.

FORMAL OPINION 99-1

Judicial Ethics Committee of the

Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges

Canon 7B (1)(a)

Canon 7B (1)(c)

campaign conduct and political activity

Campaign Advertising

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a candidate for judicial office, including an incumbent judge, should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office (Canon 7). Campaign advertising must, therefore, be dignified and appropriate to judicial office. The electorate is best served by advertising which accurately showcases the candidate's credentials. The ads should not pander to the electorate. The candidate must take particular care that the ad does not in any way suggest that he or she will favor any particular group of litigants or make decisions on any basis other than the facts and the law.

A campaign ad may compare a candidate's credentials to those of other candidates for the same office. However, Canon 7 provides that a candidate should not misrepresent his qualifications or any other fact. A candidate must be scrupulously careful that what the ads say about the candidate's opponents is accurate. Once again, the ads must be dignified. Vituperative personal attacks against one's opponents are per se undignified.

The Ethics Committee will not approve or disapprove any particular campaign ad. Moreover, if a candidate seeks and obtains advice from the Committee regarding campaign advertising, the candidate may not claim that the Committee's advice constitutes an endorsement or approval of a particular campaign ad.

A candidate is responsible for any ads published by his or her campaign committee. A candidate should not permit others nor suggest to others that they publish ads which contravene the constraints of the Canons.

• Canon 7 does not specifically proscribe "negative advertising." While in some limited circumstances negative advertising may be appropriate, given the nature of political ads, the Committee strongly discourages negative ads. Given the time limits of television and radio ads (10 and 30 second spots), it is very difficult to say something negative about one's opponent which is not misleading.⁽¹⁾
• An ad should not paint an attorney with the reputation of his or her clients.
• An ad which either directly or by innuendo refers to the ethnic background of one's opponent is improper.
• To suggest that one's opponent favors one gender over another simply because he or she is of the opposite gender of the candidate being promoted by an ad would be a totally baseless falsification. If, on the other hand, a candidate acted in a manner which truly indicated gender bias, that fact would be fair comment.
• An ad can be accurate, but it can also be misleading. An ad which is factually accurate, but is intended to mislead the electorate by giving a false impression about one's opponent violates Canon 7. Once again, the electorate is best served by ads which showcase a candidate's credentials and seek the support of the electorate on the basis of those credentials.

In summary, Canon 7 provides that:

A candidate . . . should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office . . . [and] should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact . . .

The principal parameters of campaign advertising are accuracy and dignity.

At the end of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a section entitled "Reliance on Advisory Opinions" which provides that although the advisory opinions of the Judicial Ethics Committee are not binding upon the [Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline] and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the opinions shall be taken into account in determining whether discipline should be recommended or imposed. The "rule of reliance" applies to this Formal Opinion. However, before engaging in contemplated conduct, any judge who, out of an abundance of caution, desires a Committee opinion which will provide advice about the judge's particular set of facts and to which the "rule of reliance" will also apply, may submit an inquiry to a member of the Committee, ordinarily, a member serving in the judge's Conference zone.

FOOTNOTE

1. One could, for instance, say of a sitting judge, "Judge X freed three accused murderers." Though such a statement might be accurate, it might also be misrepresentation by innuendo. If, for instance, Judge X freed the accused murderers because either the judge or the jury acquitted the accused, then the effect of the ad would be to vilify someone for doing what was totally proper. The clear implication of the ad is that the judge treated murderers leniently, which is misleading.

FORMAL OPINION 99-2

Judicial Ethics Committee of the

Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges

Canon 2A

Canon 3B (3)

comply with the law

integrity and impartiality

disciplinary measures

Reporting Suspected Tax Evasion

What, if any, is the responsibility of a trial judge to report suspected tax evasion to the appropriate tax authority?

This question was asked of the Committee by the administrative judge of a large metropolitan family court on behalf of the judges of that court. Recognizing the statewide implications of the inquiry, the Committee has decided to issue a formal opinion in this matter.

The Code of Judicial Conduct does not mandate reports of suspected tax evasion to tax authorities. The only mandatory reporting provision in the Code provides that:

A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware.

Clearly, this provision of the Canons does not apply to suspected tax evasion or fraud. The court is not an agent of the tax authorities.

In cases of obvious and egregious fraud, a judge should consider the possibility that his or her failure to report the fraud may undermine confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.

Canon 2 provides that:

A judge should respect . . . the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity . . . of the judiciary.

The decision as to whether and when a case rises to such a level must be made by the judge on a case-by-case basis.

If a judge makes a decision to report such facts to the appropriate tax authority, it is the recommendation of the Committee that the judge do simply that--report the facts without judgment.

At the end of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a section entitled "Reliance on Advisory Opinions" which provides that although the advisory opinions of the Judicial Ethics Committee are not binding upon the [Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline] and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the opinions shall be taken into account in determining whether discipline should be recommended or imposed. The "rule of reliance" applies to this Formal Opinion. However, before engaging in contemplated conduct, any judge who, out of an abundance of caution, desires a Committee opinion which will provide advice about the judge's particular set of facts and to which the "rule of reliance" will also apply, may submit an inquiry to a member of the Committee, ordinarily, a member serving in the judge's Conference zone.

FORMAL OPINION 99-3

Judicial Ethics Committee of the

Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges

Canon 3A (6)

Canon 3A (7)

broadcasting, televising, recording or taking photographs

public comment

Judges and the Media

A judge should not comment publicly about a proceeding pending before any court. Canon 3 provides, in pertinent part:

A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.

Commentary. "Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a proceeding before a judge. The conduct of lawyers is governed by DR 7-107 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Committee notes that Pennsylvania's prohibition against public comment about pending proceedings is more restrictive than the Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the American Bar Association in 1990. The Model Code provides as follows:

A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing (emphasis added).

The Committee suggests that the impact/fairness test of the Model Code is a good guide for deciding when a judge may make public statements in the course of his or her duties or explain the procedures of the court as permitted by Pennsylvania's Code. If there is a danger that the statement may affect the outcome of a proceeding, the judge must refrain from public comment.

Canon 3 also provides very extensive and detailed regulations with regard to the relationship between the court and the electronic media.

A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions . . .

The Canon then goes on to outline certain circumstances in which electronic broadcasting is permitted in "trial court non-jury civil proceedings." The Canon specifically excludes support, custody and divorce proceedings from his section.

A judge must be particularly circumspect with regard to criminal matters. Rule 326 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides specific guidelines to be followed in widely publicized or sensational cases. Rule 327 places specific limitations on court personnel. Finally, Rule 328 places very specific limitations on photography and broadcasting in the courtroom and its environs:

The taking of photographs in the courtroom or its environs or radio or television broadcasting from the courtroom or its environs during the progress of or in connection with any judicial proceedings, whether or not the court is actually in session, is prohibited. The environs of the courtroom is defined as the area immediately surrounding the entrances and exits to the courtroom.

This rule is not intended to prohibit the taking of photographs or radio or television broadcasting of proceedings such as naturalization ceremonies or the swearing in of public officials which may be conducted in the courtroom.

Once again, while the rules carefully circumscribe the coverage of matters pending before the court, they do not completely prohibit contact with the media. Canon 3 specifically permits public discussion of the work of the court. If, for instance, the court is establishing a new program, a judge may, in the course of his or her responsibilities, properly discuss the new program with the media, as long as the judge is careful to refrain from comment on any pending matter.

At the end of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a section entitled "Reliance on Advisory Opinions" which provides that although the advisory opinions of the Judicial Ethics Committee are not binding upon the [Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline] and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the opinions shall be taken into account in determining whether discipline should be recommended or imposed. The "rule of reliance" applies to this Formal Opinion. However, before engaging in contemplated conduct, any judge who, out of an abundance of caution, desires a Committee opinion which will provide advice about the judge's particular set of facts and to which the "rule of reliance" will also apply, may submit an inquiry to a member of the Committee, ordinarily, a member serving in the judge's Conference zone.

FORMAL OPINION 2000-1

Judicial Ethics Committee of the

Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges

Canon 7A (1)(b)

Canon 7A (2)

Canon 7A (4)

publicly endorse a candidate

speak

nomination petition

political activity and political conduct

Signing Nominating Petitions

Majority Opinion

The Committee has received several requests for advice asking whether it is permissible for a judge to sign a candidate's nomination petition. Because of the importance of this issue throughout the Commonwealth, the Committee issues this Formal Opinion. A bare majority of the Committee is of the opinion that signing a nomination petition is prohibited; a minority of the Committee is of the opinion that signing a nomination petition is permitted.

Candidates for elective office who wish to have their names placed on the ballot for the primary election of a major political party must obtain a certain number of signatures of the voters of the party on a nomination petition. See generally 25 P.S. sections 2862, 2869.

Code of Judicial Conduct 7A (1)(b) prohibits a judge or candidate for judicial office from publicly endorsing a candidate for public office except as authorized by section 7A (2). Code of Judicial Conduct 7A (2) permits a judge holding an office filled by public election between competing candidates, or a candidate for such office, among other things, "to speak on behalf of any other judicial candidate for the same office."

Code of Judicial Conduct 7A (4) prohibits a judge from engaging "in other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice."

A majority of the Committee joins the Florida Committee and concludes that a judge may not sign a candidate's nomination petition. Florida Committee on Standards of Conduct for Judges Opinion 92-32. A majority of the Committee declines to follow other committees which have permitted signing.⁽²⁾

Signing a nomination petition is the legal equivalent of a public endorsement and public endorsements are prohibited by Code of Judicial Conduct 7A (1)(b). Signing a nomination petition is not similar to exercising the right to vote.⁽³⁾ For example, voting is private. In contrast, a nomination petition is public; it is filed with the Department of State and is available for public inspection.

Moreover, the demographics of Pennsylvania suggest that signing nomination petitions would in most, if not all, judicial districts of small population be more likely to produce more harm than good and it is not appropriate for the conduct in question to have two entirely opposite results depend solely upon the size of the population of a judicial district.

The election process routinely causes or leads candidates to seize upon whatever tactical advantages exist without regard for undesirable collateral effects. When a judge signs a nomination petition often, especially in judicial districts with small populations, the candidate may publicize it as an endorsement regardless of the signer's intent. Because the judge in exercising the right to sign a nomination petition may prove to be one of the many casualties of an election war despite the judge's best efforts to stay off the field of battle, a uniform prohibition on signing nomination petitions is required.

Further, signing a nomination petition is prohibited as other political activity under Code of Judicial Conduct 7A (4).

Therefore, a majority of the Committee concludes that a judge is prohibited from signing a nomination petition.

Dissenting Opinion

A substantial minority of the Committee is of the opinion that a judge may sign a nomination petition of a candidate.⁽⁴⁾ This opinion agrees with the clear majority of other ethics committees which have addressed the issue. New York (Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 89-89), Tennessee (Opinion 90-4), New Mexico (Judicial Advisory Opinion 96-01), Michigan (Judicial Tenure Commission Advisory Opinion 25 (July 23, 1981)), and Arizona (Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 96-7) all permit signing a nomination petition.

Signing a nomination petition is not the legal equivalent of a public endorsement. It is merely an act to permit a candidate to stand for election in a primary. It is similar to exercising the right to vote. New York (Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 89-89); New Mexico (Judicial Advisory Opinion 96-01); Arizona (Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 96-7).

The Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 96-7 states:

A nominating petition does not contain a promise to vote for the nominee or any endorsement of the nominee. The restriction on the number of petitions that any given elector may sign appears to be a device to ensure the earnestness of signatories and does not imply an endorsement. Accordingly, we find nothing inappropriate in the signing of a petition. Such activity is normal participation in the political process by a voter that Canon 5A intends to permit.

Moreover, the right to vote is a fundamental right. A Code of Judicial of Conduct provision which infringes upon a judge's fundamental right may be unconstitutional. E.g., Matter of Sanders, 955 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1998)(First Amendment right outweighs Canons of Judicial Conduct).

The possibility that candidates may publicize the judge's signing as evidence of the judge's support is not sufficient to restrict judges from exercising their rights. A judge should not be stripped of the right to sign a nomination petition merely because candidates may improperly exploit the situation; the judge's right should not be lost because of the conduct of others.

Not all political activity is prohibited by Canon 7. Canon 7A (4) is a "catch-all" provision which prohibits a judge from engaging in political activity other than the activities specifically prohibited or permitted in Canon 7A (1) through 7A (3), and other than measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. The title to the Canon itself says that "a Judge should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his judicial office." Furthermore, Canon 7A (1)(b) and (c) specifically except from the prohibitions contained therein the activities authorized by Canon 7A (2). Canon 7A (2) authorizes the activities therein described for "[a] judge holding an office filled by public election between competing candidates...." This is every judge in Pennsylvania, because all judicial offices in Pennsylvania are filled by such public election. In addition, voting is part of the political process, yet obviously, it also is not prohibited by the "other political activity" mentioned in Canon 7A (4).

The political activity forbidden by Canon 7A (4) is activity, other than that specifically prohibited or authorized by Canon 7, which is designed to persuade others to achieve a political result. Simply signing a nomination petition is not activity designed to persuade others to achieve a political result. It is a simply an act of one individual which when combined with the similar and independent acts of a sufficient number of other individuals permits a candidate's name to be placed on the ballot. By signing, a judge is acting as an individual, not as a judge, and he or she is not attempting to persuade others to sign the candidate's nomination petition any more than the act of voting is an attempt to persuade others to vote for a particular candidate.

In contrast, a judge may not solicit others to sign a nomination petition and may not circulate a nomination petition. Accord New York (Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 89-89); contra New Mexico (Judicial Advisory Opinion 96-01). Those activities are attempts to influence others which are political activities forbidden by Canon 7A (4).

FOOTNOTES

2. Arizona (Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 96-7) permits signing under certain circumstances. New York (Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 89-89), which permits signing, prohibits participation in any political campaign, but unlike Pennsylvania, does not expressly prohibit publicly endorsing a candidate. Tennessee (Opinion 90-4), which permits signing, prohibits publicly endorsing a candidate and taking a public position on political issues. New Mexico (Judicial Advisory Opinion 96-01), which permits signing, has a less restrictive prohibition on endorsing than Pennsylvania. New Mexico prohibits publicly endorsing a candidate through the news media or in campaign literature. Michigan (Judicial Tenure Commission Advisory Opinion 25 (July 23, 1981)), which permits signing, unlike Pennsylvania does not have an express general prohibition against political activity.

3. Although the majority is aware that other committees have concluded otherwise, e. g., New York (Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 89-89); New Mexico (Judicial Advisory Opinion 96-01); Arizona (Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 96-7), the majority of the Committee rejects that view.

4. We do not agree with the single committee, Florida's committee, which has expressed a contrary view. Florida Committee on Standards of Conduct for Judges Opinion 92-32.

In contrast to Pennsylvania, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct expressly provides the time when defeated or withdrawn judicial candidates must end fund raising. That time is the earlier of the time the campaign debt is paid off or 120 days after the defeat or withdrawal. Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct 7(C)(4)(b),(c). Candidates who participate in the general election may raise funds until 120 days after the general election. Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct 7(C)(4)(a).

In New York judicial candidates who do not run in the general election can raise funds for six months after the primary, convention, caucus, or meeting. New York Codes, Rules and Regulations sections 100.0 (Q), 100.5 (A)(5). Candidates who run in the general election may raise funds for six months after the general election. Id.

Some other jurisdictions measure the ending time for fund raising from the number days after the last election in which the candidate participates during the election year and do not expressly address withdrawn candidates. E.g., Nebraska Code of Judicial Conduct 5C (2)(30 days); Washington Code of Judicial Conduct 7B (2)(60 days); North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct 5C (2)(90 days); Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics 7B (4)(b)(120 days). The 1972 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the 1990 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide for 90 days.

The Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits any fund raising after the general election. Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court 4.300, Code of Judicial Conduct 5B (2).

Louisiana permits post election fund raising only for the purpose of extinguishing campaign debt resulting from that election. Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct 7D (3).

Rationale for the Committee's Opinion

Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct 7B (2) provides in pertinent part:

A candidate's committees may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than thirty (30) days prior to the first day for filing nominating petitions or the last day for filing a declaration of intention to seek reelection on a retention basis, and all fundraising activities in connection with such judicial campaign shall terminate no later than the last calendar day of the year in which the judicial election is held.

(Emphasis added).

The Committee observes that the Code limits candidates who participate in the general election to a post election fund raising period of less than sixty days, i. e. from the date after the general election (which is held in November) to December 31. The Committee considered whether candidates who withdraw should be limited to fund raising after their withdrawal by the same number of days as candidates who participate in the general election have after the general election, a period of less than sixty days. However, because the language of the Code provides the date by which fund raising must end rather than the number of days after the general election and does not refer to the general election in selecting the ending date, the Committee rejected the view that fund raising must end by a period of less than sixty days after the candidate withdraws, i.e. the number of days a candidate in the general election would have to fund raise after the general election.

However, as indicated by the above underlined portions of the Code, in addition to the December 31 cut off date, the Code limits fund raising "for his campaign" and "in connection with such judicial campaign." These limits require that a withdrawn judicial candidate end fund raising when the campaign debt has been extinguished. The reason is that for a withdrawn candidate, because such judicial campaign has ended, any fund raising after the debt has been extinguished could not be for "such judicial campaign." To give effect to all the provisions of Code of Judicial Conduct 7B (2), a withdrawn judicial candidate must end fund raising when the campaign debt has been extinguished or by December 31 of the election year, whichever occurs first.